




HE UNU-WIDER PROJECT ON “FRAGILITY AND 
development’’ began with the premise that dealing simultaneously with 
household vulnerability and state fragility is probably one of the most urgent 
development challenges of our time. Consequently, the project explored the 
dimensions of household vulnerability and state fragility in development. This 
research brief is about the roughly 50 or more fragile states that are home to around 
a billion people. An accompanying UNU research brief considers vulnerability in 
developing countries (see UNU Research Brief No. 2, 2008).
State fragility has serious repercussions for national and international security 
and prosperity. Many fragile states are ravaged by conflict and have become “failed” 
states. Some have only recently emerged from devastating civil wars and remain 
fragile. Others have histories of military coups or have been through serious political 
crises. Others still are small states with limited resource endowments and high 
debts, and are subject to natural hazards that render them extremely unstable. 
The UNU-WIDER project on “Fragility and Development” brought an 
economic perspective to the concept and classification of fragile states, the costs 
they impose on global development and security, and the challenges they and the 
international community face in the quest for development, particularly for those in 
or emerging from conflict. A number of pertinent questions were addressed. When 
are states fragile? What are the costs that fragile states impose on their people and 
the international community? Should the sovereignty of fragile states in conflict 
be reconsidered? How can peace agreements be enforced through appropriate 
economic incentives? How does conflict impact disproportionately on women? How 
can aid flows to fragile states be made more effective? 
The studies addressing these questions are summarized in the box “Selected 
WIDER Papers Dealing with Fragile States”, which also refers to their UNU-
WIDER research paper numbers to facilitate downloading from the website 
(www.wider.unu.edu). 
Which States are Fragile?
The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edition, 1989) defines the word “fragile” as 
meaning “liable to break or be broken; easily snapped or shattered; in a looser sense, 
weak, perishable, easily destroyed”. In the context of independent political states 
or countries, the term “fragile” seems to imply the existence of states or territories 
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or function to any normal degree, they 
can even be labelled as “failed states”. 
A number of definitions and 
measurements of fragile states have 
been proposed. Most of these have been 
developed by international financial 
institutions and development agencies, 
reflecting their concern that countries 
may be too fragile to use aid effectively.
One of the best-known definitions 
is that of the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID), 
which defines a fragile state as one 
where “the government cannot or 
will not deliver core functions to the 
majority of its people, including the 
poor”. Core functions here include 
the provision of basic services such 
as education, health, safety and 
security, often the focus of donor aid 
programmes.
The World Bank and the OECD 
classify states as fragile based on 
their score in the Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
ratings: a low-income country with 
a CPIA score of 3.0 or less is seen as 
fragile. These countries are also termed 
“low-income countries under stress” 
(LICUS), and have been described 
as “difficult partnership countries” to 
denote the fact that the underlying 
concern of the World Bank and the 
OECD is that countries may be too 
fragile to use aid effectively. 
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz and Mark 
McGillivray (RP2008-44) take issue 
with the choice of a rigid CPIA score 
of 3.0 as the cut-off point for deciding 
whether or not a country is too “fragile” 
to use aid effectively. In their words, “all 
countries are fragile to the extent that 
their ability to use aid differs. Some are 
simply more fragile than others.” To 
take into account that fragility differs 
along a continuum, they propose a 
framework that uses fuzzy-set theory, 
which allows for a more gradual 
distinction to be made between fragile 
and non-fragile states. They apply 
this to the 2005 CPIA scores from 76 
countries, and conclude that using the 
traditional methods to classify countries 
may lead to some countries being 
incorrectly classified.
Another operational definition of 
fragile states stems from the Canadian 
International Development Agency’s 
“Country Indicators for Foreign 
Policy (CIFP)” project. For the UNU-
WIDER project David Carment, 
Yiagadeesen Samy and Stewart Prest 
(RP2008-46) provided a critical review 
of the CIFP Fragility Index. In this 
index the fundamental causes of state 
fragility are broader than just violent 
conflict. In particular, in the CIFP 
Fragility Index, state fragility is due to 
threats to the authority (A), legitimacy 
(L) and capacity (C) of the state. These 
so-called ALC components are used to 
gauge state performance across various 
dimensions, including economic, 
governance, security and crime, 
human development, demographic 
and environmental dimensions. 
They use this approach to compile a 
fragility index for countries over the 
period 1999–2005. Here it is only the 
degree of fragility that differs between 
countries. In the CIFP Fragility Index 
70 per cent of the 40 most fragile states 
are in sub-Saharan Africa. 
When Do Fragile States Fail?
The Political Instability Task Force 
(PITF), previously the State Failure 
Task Force, describes four types of 
conflict events that can push a fragile 
state into failure: revolutionary wars, 
ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, 
and genocides and politicides (see 
http:/ /globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/). 
From these types of conflict the PITF 
has compiled a consolidated list of state 
failures over the period 1955 to 2006. 
Over this period they record no fewer 
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107 countries. Although they note that 
the number of wars and civil conflicts in 
the world had declined since the end of 
the Cold War, there were still at least 18 
countries that, by the end of 2006, were 
in a state of serious conflict or state 
failure. A disproportionate number of 
failing states in conflict are in Africa 
(about 40 per cent) and the Middle and 
Near East (50 per cent).
Many of the states that were in 
conflict previously, and which are now 
in post-conflict reconstructive phases, 
remain in a precarious, very fragile 
condition. One major reason for continued 
fragility is that the possibility of a 
relapse into conflict is high. Another 
reason is the economic impact of violent 
conflict on a country’s development 
and development prospects. A growing 
literature has examined the costs of con-
flict, especially civil war. Most estimates 
suggest that the impacts of civil war 
are substantial and long-lasting and 
include direct costs such as destruction 
of infrastructure, diverted (military) 
expenditure and indirect costs such as 
the disruption of markets and increase 
in risk and uncertainty. Civil conflict 
also has spillover effects reducing 
growth in neighbouring countries.
Conflict, which undermines the 
authority and legitimacy of the state 
and limits prospects for development, 
is clearly a major cause of fragility, 
and of identifying countries as fragile. 
However, weak or fragile states, 
due to low development status, in 
themselves can lead to conflict and an 
ensuing vicious cycle from fragility to 
conflict, and from conflict to further 
fragility. Thus the causality between 
state fragility and failure and conflict 
is multi-directional. In practice, given 
the complex nature of many conflicts, 
it is most often difficult to disentangle 
the various influences, especially when 
conflicts have persisted for many 
years.
The relationship between state 
fragility and state failure has been taken 
up in this project. 
Ghassan Dibeh (RP2008-35) 
studies the causes and consequences 
when fragile states become failed 
states.  He does so using the cases of 
Iraq and Somalia, and shows that while 
states such as oil-rich Iraq may fail due 
to conflict over bountiful resources, 
those poor in resources, like Somalia, 
may also fail because no group has an 
interest in forming a central authority. 
To understand the relationship between 
resources, state structures and economic 
growth, Dibeh provides an overview of 
the theoretical literature and a model 
of the relationship between resources 
and the formation of government. 
This is then applied to the situations 
in Iraq and Somalia.  He provides a 
useful reminder that it is often difficult 
to predict in advance state failure, 
and that the importance of good 
leadership in the context of strong 
governance institutions should not be 
underestimated. These lessons emerge 
from a historical overview of Iraq’s 
economic development since the 1960s. 
Three periods are contrasted: the era 
before the first Gulf War (1991), the 
era of international isolation between 
1991 and 2003, and the subsequent 
post-Saddam Hussein period following 
the 2003 US-led invasion. In essence 
All countries are fragile to the extent that their ability to use aid 
differs. Some are simply more fragile than others
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the story of the rise and fall of Iraq is 
of a country failing due to avoidable 
external conflicts (war with Iran and 
the occupation of Kuwait) and internal 
conflicts (failing to establish trust and 
co-operation between Sunni, Shiite, and 
Kurdish groups). The policy implication 
is that efforts to end conflict in failed 
states will differ significantly depending 
on the availability and distribution of 
resources, and the resulting incentive 
structures facing conflicting parties: 
one-size-fits-all externally imposed 
solutions are not likely to bring lasting 
peace and development.
What are the Costs and 
Consequences of Fragile States?
Major contributions were made by 
the UNU-WIDER “Fragility and 
Development” project in quantifying 
the macro-level costs, and illustrating 
the micro-level impacts, of failed and 
fragile states. Much of the existing 
literature on the costs of fragile states 
is limited to an assessment of the costs 
of violent conflict (war, civil war). In 
contrast, Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier 
and Anke Hoeffler (RP2007-30) 
estimate the full costs of a failing state. 
They argue that states can fail in three 
ways: by causing negative spillovers for 
citizens of neighbouring countries, by 
failing to provide basic security for their 
own citizens and by failing to create 
and maintain an environment for the 
progressive and sustainable reduction of 
poverty. The core argument here is that 
in these three ways failing (or fragile) 
states impose costs which, if large 
enough, may justify overriding their 
national sovereignty by international 
intervention. They calculate that the 
combined total cost of failing states 
(using the World Bank’s classification 
of LICUS) is around US$276 billion 
Selected WIDER Papers Dealing with Fragile States
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The combined total cost of failing states is around US$276 billion 
per annum
per annum – more than twice what 
international aid flows would be if the 
OECD countries actually reach the UN 
target of giving 0.7 per cent of their 
GDP in aid. This suggests that there 
are significant benefits in solving the 
problems of fragile states. 
Other papers in this project 
provide country and household-
level assessments of the costs of state 
failure. Sebnem Akkaya, Norbert 
Fiess, Bartlomeij Kaminski and Gael 
Raballand (in a paper presented at the 
UNU-WIDER Conference on Fragile 
States in June 2007) assess the costs 
and consequences of Israeli border 
closures for the West Bank and Gaza 
(WB&G) economy. This research notes 
that Israeli security arrangements (such 
as checkpoints and road closures) have 
placed restrictions on the movement 
of goods and people to and from the 
WB&G, imposing significant economic 
costs. The authors estimate that one 
day of closure costs the WB&G 
about US$7 million in lost income. In 
addition to these macro-economic costs 
they consider the impact of closures 
on remittances, employment, transport 
costs, external trade and future 
economic activity. The loss in income of 
Palestinian workers in Israel between 
2001 and 2003 is estimated to total 
more than US$3 billion, and the loss of 
export earnings as US$693 million. As 
the case of Palestine illustrates, conflict 
leads to isolation and fragmentation, 
which ultimately imposes huge 
economic costs, further weakening the 
state’s capacity to address development 
progressively.
The costs of state fragility do not 
impact equally on all members of a 
society: women are often seen to be 
particularly affected. Sumon Kumar 
Bhaumik, Ira Gang and Myeong-
Su Yun (RP2008-43) investigate 
whether female-headed households, 
particularly in relation to their ethnic 
group, suffer more after a conflict. 
They do this using household data on 
Serbian and Albanian households in 
the Balkan region of Kosovo, a region 
characterized by decades of political 
strife and outright armed conflict 
during most of the 1990s. They find 
that female-headed households did 
not on average suffer more than male-
headed households, but when ethnic 
affiliation is taken into consideration, 
the picture changes. They also find 
that living standards of minority Serb 
households are lower than those of 
Albanian households, with female-
headed Serbian households having the 
lowest standard of living in Kosovo. The 
authors conclude that “we need to study 
welfare in fragile states, where conflicts 
among ethnicities or tribes or political 
ideologies are at the forefront, not 
only from the ethnicity/tribe/ideology 
perspective, but also from gender 
perspectives”. This is an important 
message for finding ways and means of 
mitigating the impact of violent conflict 
in fragile states and aiding post-conflict 
reconstruction.
Tilman Brück and Kati Schindler 
(RP2008-83) further explore the 
plight of women when states fail to 
provide security. The paper shows that, 
based on published statistics, the wars 
in Afghanistan and Vietnam and the 
1994 genocide in Rwanda brought 
700,000, 1,000,000 and 500,000 
women into widowhood, respectively. 
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This study fills an important gap in 
the literature on “widows and conflict” 
by analysing the main channels 
through which mass violent conflict 
affects households, namely household 
boundaries, household activities and 
intra-household relations and gender 
roles. Their findings indicate that, first, 
household boundaries, activities and 
intra-household relations and gender 
roles are likely to be affected strongly 
by mass violent conflict and fragility. 
Second, households are likely to be 
constrained in their choice of coping 
strategies because conflict potentially 
destroys various production inputs. 
As a result, a household’s income-
generating activities may entail higher 
risk and a reduced profit margin. 
Arguably, the efficiency of aid to 
countries in or emerging from conflict 
may be improved from this better 
understanding of the situation facing 
the many women-headed households 
that characterize post-conflict 
communities.
What Can Be Done About Fragile 
States?
The final group of research papers asks 
how the international community can 
assist fragile states, given what we 
know of their causes, costs and 
consequences.
A two-pronged approach can 
be supported from the findings of 
this project, consisting of adopting a 
holistic approach towards fragile states 
and improving the effectiveness of 
assistance to these states. 
A broad and holistic approach 
is needed, requiring a wide range of 
interventions from the international 
community. As explained by David 
Carment and co-authors (RP2008-
46), this range of interventions should 
include aiming to improve the authority 
and legitimacy of states and their 
capacity to provide basic services. 
One controversial form these 
interventions can take is the suggestion 
by Chauvet and co-authors (RP2007-
30) that national sovereignty should be 
overridden in certain cases in order to 
limit the negative spillover effects that 
fragile states impose on neighbouring 
countries. 
On a related note, Mansoob 
Murshed and Philip Verwimp 
(RP2008-45) argue strongly for the 
vital role of international intervention 
and mediation in securing sustainable 
peace agreements. The paper implies 
that it is difficult to sustain peace 
agreements following civil wars, citing as 
examples the Addis Ababa Agreement 
(1972), the Arusha Agreement (1993) 
and the Angolan Peace Agreements 
(1991 and 1994). They recognize 
that “most peace agreements between 
warring factions in contemporary 
developing country civil wars are not 
self-enforcing” and that “most civil 
wars cannot be ended without outside 
intervention, including the use of aid, 
trade restrictions, and peacekeeping 
efforts”. The paper’s arguments are 
illustrated by a discussion of the 
fragile state of Rwanda, where the 
1993 peace agreement failed, setting 
in motion events that led to the 
massacre of at least 500,000 Tutsis. 
The authors also construct an analytical 
“signalling” model of peace agreements 
that shows why self-enforcing peace 
agreements are so difficult to achieve. 
The model in particular shows that 
external intervention can work if it is 
It is in the global interest to help fragile states
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credible – providing important food 
for thought for those concerned about 
the effectiveness of such intervention in 
many of today’s most enduring violent 
conflicts.
The second prong of the approach 
to dealing with fragile states is 
to improve the effectiveness of 
international assistance, in particular 
aid and humanitarian assistance. Aid 
effectiveness has spawned a large 
literature, which is partly surveyed 
by Mark McGillivray, but has tended 
to neglect the case of fragile states. 
In McGillivray’s survey and that by 
Sanjeev Gupta, the question of how to 
improve aid effectiveness in fragile states 
is investigated. 
Mark McGillivray (DP2006-01) 
reviews the extensive literature on how 
aid should be allocated to developing 
economies and how it is in practice 
allocated to these countries. He shows 
that, despite the apparent view that 
fragile states use aid less effectively, 
there is little in the literature to 
substantiate this view. In particular, aid 
does not affect only growth (the focus 
of much of the economics literature) 
but is important in preventing 
instability and conflict, improving 
human rights and preventing or 
limiting negative spillovers to 
neighbouring countries. Therefore, 
McGillivray argues for aid to fragile 
states, arguing that to the extent that 
there might be absorptive capacity 
constraints, these might be avoided by 
allocating aid via non-governmental 
channels.
Sanjeev Gupta (RP2008-07) 
points out that the literature on aid 
spending absorption in fragile states 
is still in its infancy. He adds to this 
literature by discussing the macro-
economic implications of aid flows for 
fragile states, and in particular for post-
conflict countries. The paper shows 
that these depend on the configuration 
between aid absorption and spending; 
that is, whether or not aid is absorbed 
and spent, or absorbed but not spent, 
or neither absorbed nor spent, or 
spent but not absorbed. Aspects that 
influence this decision are a country’s 
macro-economic position, its capacity 
to absorb aid and the quality of its 
institutions. Two options for fragile 
states are explored: front-loading 
of expenditure, and expenditure 
smoothing. Under the first, a country 
increases spending sharply as aid flows 
in, and reduces it again afterwards. 
Gupta suggests that this might be a 
relevant approach for post-conflict 
countries where returns to physical 
infrastructure investment are likely to 
be substantial. Under the second option, 
a country aims to keep its spending 
stable over time. According to Gupta, 
this might be an appropriate strategy for 
fragile states that face high uncertainty 
and only temporary access to aid. A 
challenge that remains if fragile states 
are to adopt these strategies successfully 
is the implementation of a supportive 
medium-term expenditure framework 
in fiscal planning. Currently such a 
level of planning is beyond the 
capabilities of many fragile states, 
and remains an area wherein the 
international community can provide 
valuable assistance.
In conclusion, this UNU-WIDER 
project has brought together a number 
of crucial contributions that have 
shown it is possible to identify fragile 
states and their causes, and to address 
these causes – and moreover that it is in 
the global interest to do so.

















This policy brief deals 
with the identification of 
fragile states and the causes 
and consequences of state 
fragility. Addressing the 
problem of fragile states is 
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